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Mapping the World Wide Web: Using Calder v. Jones to
Create a Framework for Analyzing when Statements Written
on the Internet Give Rise to Personal Jurisdiction*
INTRODUCTION
In March 2007, Kathy Sierra, a well-known game developer and
blogger, was scheduled to present at the Etech conference in San
Diego.' Instead of leading her workshop, Sierra locked herself inside
her home and was afraid to leave.2 Sierra cancelled her appearance at
the conference because she was the victim of a harassment campaign
conducted over the Internet.3 Her tormenters sent death threats,4
posted threatening images,5  and published Sierra's personal
information such as her home address in Colorado and her Social
Security number.' Sierra believes bitterness toward women with high
profiles motivated the attacks against her.7 Sierra failed to discover
the identities of her harassers,8 but one photograph was traced to a
computer owned by Alan Herrell, a tech consultant in Arizona who
denied making the image.' Sierra gave up blogging because of the
attacks.10
The incident with Kathy Sierra has not been the only recent high
profile incident of Internet harassment. Megan Meir's suicide,
* Copyright © 2009 by Alexander B. Punger.
1. Greg Sandoval, Blogger Cancels Conference Appearance after Death Threats,
CNET NEWS, Mar. 26, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-6170683-7.html.
2. Id.
3. See Don Aucoin, Sometimes it Seems as Though Nastiness Dominates the Internet.
But There Are Signs that the Web is Growing up, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2009, at G15.
4. Sandoval, supra note 1. One post encouraged others to slit Sierra's throat. Id.
5. Id. One image depicted Sierra's face next to a noose. Id. The image was
menacingly captioned "[t]he only thing Kathy has to offer me is that noose in her neck
size." Id. Another photo portrayed Sierra struggling to breathe with panties stretched
across her face. Victoria Murphy Barret, Anonymity & the Net, FORBES, Oct. 15, 2007, at
74, 80.
6. Barret, supra note 5, at 80.
7. Sandoval, supra note 1.
8. Barret, supra note 5, at 80. Sierra attempted to enlist the FBI, but the FBI was
unresponsive. Id.
9. Id. Herrell denied making or sending the image. Id.
10. See id. Kathy Sierra's thoughtful response to the incident and her explanation of
why she decided to refrain from blogging can be found on her blog. Creating Passionate
Users. http://headrush.typepad.com/ (Apr. 6, 2007).
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probably the most famous example, drew national attention." The
suicides of thirteen-year-old Ryan Halligan, of Vermont, and fifteen-
year-old Jeff Johnston, of Florida, both in response to Internet
harassment, also garnered national media attention.2  Other
examples abound that have not resonated at the national level. 3
Media coverage that focuses on incidents involving children may
create the perception that children and teenagers are the only victims
of Internet harassment, but, as Kathy Sierra's experience
demonstrates, that perception is incorrect. Many school systems have
had incidents of students harassing teachers and administrators. 4
Lawsuits have been filed in the business world because of statements
written on the Internet as well.' 5 These examples demonstrate that
Internet harassment is not limited to one geographic area, social
11. See Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at A23 [hereinafter Hoax]. Megan Meir hanged herself at the age of
thirteen because her MySpace.com friend, Josh Evans, insulted her repeatedly. Id. Josh's
final message read, "The world would be a better place without you." Id. Megan's story is
even more tragic because Josh Evans was a fictional entity created by Lori Drew, a
neighbor of the Meir's and mother of a classmate of Megan's. Id. Mrs. Drew created
"Josh Evans" in order to monitor the relationship between Megan and her daughter. Id.
Mrs. Drew subsequently denied creating the "Josh Evans" persona. Christopher Maag,
When the Bullies Turned Faceless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at ST12. Officials did not
file charges against Mrs. Drew because her conduct was not illegal. Hoax, supra. As of
November 2007, the Drews continued to live four houses down from the Meirs. Id.
12. See Linda T. Sanchez, Editorial, The New Bullying Technology: Gone are the
Days When Coming Home from School was a Refuge for Kids, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 5, 2009, at A17.
13. See, e.g., Glenn Counts, Mother Accused of Cyber Bullying Daughter's Friends,
WCNC.com, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.wcnc.com/news/local/stories/wcnc-021709-mw-
cyber-bullying.272901fl.html (reporting that Charlotte-Mecklenburg police were
investigating whether a Ballantyne-area mother cyberbullied some of her daughter's
friends); Rachel Dissell, Cyberbullying has Offline Consequences-a Shooting,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 5, 2009, at BI (describing how one Cleveland teenager
shot at another teenage girl because of an argument the two had through their MySpace
accounts).
14. See Tresa Baldas, Fake Online Profiles Trigger Suits, NAT'L. L.J., June 2, 2008, at
7. For example, school administrators and town officials in Texas, Indiana, Pennsylvania,
and Illinois have filed lawsuits because of statements written about them on MySpace and
Facebook. Id.
15. See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2002)
(involving a suit brought by the warden of a Virginia prison against two Connecticut
newspapers); Burleson v. Toback. 391 F. Supp. 2d 401, 404 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (involving a
suit filed by a trainer of miniature horses because of statements written on an Internet web
forum); Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 66-67, 662 S.E.2d 12. 14-15 (2008) (involving
a suit brought by the owner of a shooting camp against a customer because of statements
the customer wrote on an Internet message board).
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demographic, or industry, and that Internet activity may give rise to
various tort claims.1
6
While not all of the examples given involve actors across state
lines, the experiences of Sierra and others prove that statements
written on the Internet can have devastating effects on a target in a
different state.17 North Carolina, and every other state, has an
interest in protecting its citizens from the threat of Internet
harassment. Tort claims based on Internet activity will likely rise as
the Internet becomes increasingly prevalent in society.18 To protect
its citizens, North Carolina courts need guidelines in order to
consistently decide if long-arm jurisdiction can be exerted over an
out-of-state defendant who posts defamatory statements on the
Internet about a North Carolina resident.
This Recent Development will use Dailey v. Popma,9 the most
recent case involving Internet defamation heard by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, to examine these jurisdictional issues. In
Dailey, the court failed to protect state residents from Internet
defamation because it placed too much emphasis on the
omnipresence of the Internet in the abstract when dismissing the case
for lack of personal jurisdiction, rather than focusing on the specific
Internet activity involved in the case.2" The plaintiff, Jack Dailey, a
North Carolina resident, claimed North Carolina had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, Donald Popma, because Popma had
minimum contacts with North Carolina as a result of the defamatory
16. For a profile of a social clique that sets its social hierarchy based on the quality
and number of cyberbullying attacks, see generally Mattathias Schwartz, Inside the World
of Online Trolls Who Use the Internet to Harass, Humiliate and Torment Strangers.
Malwebolence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, (Magazine), at 24.
17. For example, one of the images used to harass Sierra, a Colorado resident, was
traced to a computer in Arizona. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Young,
315 F.3d at 258 (deciding whether two Connecticut newspapers could be sued in Virginia
because the articles discussed a Virginia prison and its warden); Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at
66, 662 S.E.2d at 14 (involving a North Carolina plaintiff and a Georgia defendant).
18. See Jaana Juvonen & Elisheva F. Gross, Extending the School Grounds? -
Bullying Experiences in Cyberspace, 78 J. SCH. HEALTH 496, 500, 502 (2008) (finding
seventy-two percent of the sample group of twelve- to seventeen-year-old children had
been cyberbullied, but only ten percent reported the bullying).
19. 191 N.C. App. 64, 662 S.E.2d 12 (2008).
20. The North Carolina Court of Appeals first discussed the Internet in relation to
personal jurisdiction in Havey v. Valentine, 172 N.C. App. 812, 816-17, 616 S.E.2d 642,
647-48 (2005). See Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 70, 662 S.E.2d at 17 ("The only North
Carolina case dealing with internet activity as a basis for personal jurisdiction is Havey v.
Valentine .... "). Havey involved whether a Vermont corporation purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of conducting business in North Carolina by operating a website. See
Havey, 172 N.C. App. at 816-17, 616 S.E.2d at 647-48. It did not involve Internet
defamation. See id.
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statements he wrote about Dailey on an Internet message board.2'
The North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the case because it
believed personal jurisdiction could not be based on Popma's Internet
conduct. 22 This Recent Development asserts that the court erred in
its dismissal. The court reached this decision because it failed to
adapt the underlying reasoning of Calder v. Jones23 to an Internet
context.
In Calder, two Florida reporters wrote an article about a famous
California actress; a national magazine, with a substantial number of
its readers in California, published the article. 24  The United States
Supreme Court found the defendants had minimum contacts with
California because California was the focus of the story and the
injury.25 Stated simply, jurisdiction was proper because of the
"effects" the defendants' Florida conduct had in California.26
The reasoning used in Calder has subsequently come to be
known as the "effects" test.2 ' The "effects" test 28 is essentially a
short-hand way of saying minimum contacts exist, but it does not
explain when one can reasonably foresee being called to a forum
because of the effects of his actions. The Court found that the
defendants in Calder targeted California with their conduct based on
three factors: 1) the defendants' choice of publication medium; 2)
their knowledge of where the plaintiff lived and worked; and 3) their
intentional actions.29 California could exercise jurisdiction over the
Florida defendants consistent with due process requirements because
21. Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 66, 662 S.E.2d at 14-15.
22. Id. at 75, 662 S.E.2d at 19.
23. 465 U.S. 783 (1983).
24. Id. at 784-85.
25. Id. at 789.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 400-02 (5th Cir. 2009)
(discussing the applicability of the "effects" test to the case at issue); Licciardello v.
Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) (referring to the "effects" test); ESAB
Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 622 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating the district court
denied the motion to dismiss based on the "effects" test from Calder v. Jones); Sea-Roy
Corp. v. Parts R Parts, No. 1:94CV00059, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21859, at *30-32
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 1995) (discussing the "effects" doctrine); cf Cynthia L. Counts & C.
Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for Addressing Liability and
Jurisdictional Issues in this New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1083, 1123 (1996) (stating the
"effects" test interpretation of Calder actually "ignores the operative facts in Calder which
demonstrate that the defendants' contacts were not random, but quite substantial").
28. This Recent Development will use "effects" to refer to the reasoning used in
Calder. That is, the defendant specifically targeted the forum, and thus, the forum can
exert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The word effects, without quotes, refers to
the results of someone's actions.
29. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
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the combination of the factors meant the defendants could have
reasonably foreseen being haled to California." These three factors
will be referred to as the "Calder factors."
North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit use a test consistent with
the reasoning in Calder to determine if actions on the Internet give
rise to personal jurisdiction.3" Thus, Calder should inform what is
required to manifest intent to direct Internet communications toward
a forum state.32 Using these factors will provide guidance as to when
a defendant should reasonably be able to foresee being called to a
forum to answer for the effects of his Internet statements. Given that
Popma chose a publication medium focused on North Carolina, knew
Dailey was a resident of the state, and intentionally wrote the
messages, the North Carolina Court of Appeals should have found
personal jurisdiction existed in North Carolina because his statements
were written on an Internet forum directed at North Carolina and the
majority of their effects would be felt there.33
This Recent Development proceeds as follows: Part I gives a
brief overview of the process North Carolina courts use to determine
whether they can assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state citizens
and how North Carolina courts have adapted traditional concepts of
constitutional due process to the Internet. In Part II, this Recent
Development will demonstrate that, by failing to use Calder as a
model for the test for personal jurisdiction based on Internet
communications, the court in Dailey improperly affirmed the trial
court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Applying the
"Calder factors" to Dailey will illustrate how the factors place limits
on jurisdiction, thereby preventing the demise of the defense of
personal jurisdiction.34 Finally, in Part III, this Recent Development
will demonstrate how the fairness factors of a traditional
jurisdictional analysis support a finding that jurisdiction in Dailey was
constitutional. Since the North Carolina Court of Appeals did not
30. Id. That is to say jurisdiction was proper because of the effects of the defendants'
action.
31. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir.
2002) (stating that its rule is "not dissimilar" to the reasoning in Calder v. Jones); Havey v.
Valentine, 172 N.C. App. 812, 816-17, 616 S.E.2d 642, 647-48 (2005) (adopting the rules
described in ALS Scan).
32. This Recent Development will only discuss personal jurisdiction in an Internet
context.
33. Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 66-67, 662 S.E.2d 12, 14-15 (2008).
34. The court in Dailey worried that allowing these Internet communications to
establish personal jurisdiction would lead to the end of the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction, Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 73, 662 S.E.2d at 18. These factors inherently set
limits that will prevent this fear from materializing.
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structure its decision on these factors, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina should remand the decision so that the North Carolina
Court of Appeals can conduct a more in-depth analysis of these
factors, which will provide guidance for future opinions."
I. NORTH CAROLINA'S PROCESS FOR OBTAINING JURISDICTION
OVER OUT-OF-STATE RESIDENTS
North Carolina courts follow a two-step process to determine
whether North Carolina can acquire personal jurisdiction over an out-
of-state defendant. First, the court determines if the defendant comes
within the reach of North Carolina's "long-arm statute."36 If the court
determines that the defendant satisfies North Carolina's long-arm
statute, then the court asks whether exercising jurisdiction would
"violate the due process clause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to
the United States Constitution."37  Neither party disputed the
applicability of North Carolina's long-arm statute in Dailey.38 Thus,
the only issue before the North Carolina Court of Appeals was
whether the trial court correctly determined "that asserting
jurisdiction over... [Popma] would violate due process."39
"To satisfy the due process prong of the personal jurisdiction
analysis, there must be sufficient 'minimum contacts' between the
nonresident defendant and ... [North Carolina] 'such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "40
A plaintiff could allege that the defendant had sufficient
minimum contacts to support general or specific jurisdiction.4
"Specific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action arises from or is
35. A remand is more appropriate than a reversal because the factual record needs to
be developed before a conclusion can be reached. Furthermore, a remand would allow
the court of appeals to develop the facts concerning the "Calder factors."
36. See Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782,
785 (1986). A long-arm statute is "a statute providing for jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant who has had contacts with the territory where the statute is in effect." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 961 (8th ed. 2004). For an example, see North Carolina's long-arm
statute at section 1-75.4 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
75.4 (2007).
37. Tom Togs, Inc., 318 N.C. at 364,348 S.E.2d at 785.
38. Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 69, 662 S.E.2d at 16.
39. Id.
40. Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114,122, 638 S.E.2d 203, 210 (2006) (quoting
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
41. See id.
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related to defendant's contacts with the forum."42 For the defendant
to have minimum contacts to support specific jurisdiction, the
defendant must have "purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."43 The United States Supreme
Court provided an additional gloss for minimum contacts in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.' After World-Wide, courts may
also describe minimum contacts as requiring that the "relationship
between the defendant and the forum ... be 'such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.' "" The gloss
used, however, does not affect the personal jurisdiction analysis; both
"purposeful availment" and "reasonable anticipation" merely
describe the same analysis.46 Yet, no matter how a court describes the
test for minimum contacts, finding that a defendant had minimum
contacts to support specific jurisdiction is a fact-specific inquiry.47
42. Id. at 122, 638 S.E.2d at 210 ("General jurisdiction exists when the defendant's
contacts with the state are not related to the cause of action but the defendant's activities
in the forum are sufficiently 'continuous and systematic.' ") (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)). Dailey did not allege
general jurisdiction, so it will not be discussed. See Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 70, 662 S.E.2d
at 16.
43. Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 705, 208 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1974) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
44. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
45. See Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 365-66, 348 S.E.2d
782, 786 (1986) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
46. See id. at 367, 348 S.E.2d at 787 (failing to mention whether the defendant could
have reasonably anticipated being haled to North Carolina when the court found the
defendant had minimum contacts with North Carolina because the defendant purposefully
availed himself of the protection of North Carolina laws); Baker v. Lanier Marine
Liquidators, Inc., 187 N.C. App. 711, 717, 654 S.E.2d 41, 46 (2007) (finding minimum
contacts because the defendant purposefully availed itself of the protection of North
Carolina law and should have reasonably anticipated being haled into North Carolina);
First Union Nat'l Bank v. Bankers Wholesale Mortgage, LLC, 153 N.C. App. 248, 253-54,
570 S.E.2d 217, 221 (2002) (stating minimum contacts existed because the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the right to conduct business in North Carolina without
explicitly analyzing whether the defendant reasonably anticipated being haled into North
Carolina).
47. Compare Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 679-80, 231 S.E.2d
629, 632-33 (1977) (stating the defendant established minimum contacts with North
Carolina by making mass mailings to state residents, selling more than $50,000 worth of
coins to twenty-seven different residents in 142 distinct transactions, and sending a
company representative to appraise the coins of a Burlington, North Carolina resident),
and Bankers Wholesale Mortgage, 153 N.C. App. at 253-54, 570 S.E.2d at 221-22 (finding
the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process because defendant
registered in North Carolina as a mortgage banker, "posted a $25,000 surety bond to
obtain registration," and accepted payment from plaintiff's North Carolina offices for
forty-five loans it made to the plaintiff), with Skinner, 361 N.C. at 123-24, 638 S.E.2d at
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In certain situations, a defendant may lack physical contacts with
the forum, but jurisdiction may be proper if the defendant targeted
the forum with his actions.4" Jurisdiction is proper when a defendant
targets the forum because a defendant can anticipate being haled to a
state he targeted.49 Calder v. Jones was the first instance when a court
exerted specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant because
the defendant targeted the forum." That reasoning is sometimes
referred to as the "effects" test.51 The "effects" test is simply a
specialized method of demonstrating that the defendant had
minimum contacts with the forum. The "Calder factors" are useful
because they illustrate what is required for a defendant to target a
forum.
Because the Internet is omnipresent, courts have adapted
minimum contacts principles to analyze whether Internet conduct
supports personal jurisdiction." North Carolina courts use the test
described in ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants53 as
211, 213 (2006) (holding that the court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident trust which holds notes secured by deeds of trust on North Carolina real
property because creation of the trust occurred outside of North Carolina, day-to-day
operation of the trust occurred in New York, the trust's equitable interest in North
Carolina real estate was an insufficient contact, and the trust did not directly receive
payments from North Carolina), Cambridge Homes of N.C., L.P. v. Hyundai Constr., Inc.,
- N.C. App. _, _, 670 S.E.2d 290, 298-99 (2008) (holding that a Korean company that
manufactured a resin used with vinyl siding did not have minimum contacts with North
Carolina even though it injected its products into the stream of commerce because it did
not initiate contact with North Carolina companies, solicit business activities in the state,
or have any distributors in the state), and Tutterrow v. Leach, 107 N.C. App. 703, 709, 421
S.E.2d 816, 820 (1992) (holding that defendants did not have minimum contacts with
North Carolina even though they entered into a contract with a state resident because they
never solicited their business in the state, their only contacts with the forum state were
isolated phone calls and a "handful of letters," and the plaintiff initiated contact with
them).
48. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984); Retail Software Serv., Inc. v.
Lashlee, 854 F.2d 18, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1988) (using Calder to justify allowing New York to
exert personal jurisdiction over two out-of-state defendants who entered into seven
franchise agreements in New York); Saxon v. Smith, 125 N.C. App. 163, 172, 479 S.E.2d
793, 793-94 (1997) (finding North Carolina could exert jurisdiction over a Virginia
resident because the Virginian targeted North Carolina by distributing a newsletter in
North Carolina and filing a complaint with North Carolina law enforcement).
49. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
50. Id. at 789-91; Scotts Co. v. Aventis S.A., 2005 FED App. 0661N, 19, 145 F.
App'x 109, 113 (6th Cir.) (noting the effects test was "first articulated in Calder v. Jones").
51. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789; Counts & Martin, supra note 27, at 1123.
52. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002);
Irving v. Wagner Zone Inc., 68 Va. Cir. 127, 130 (Cir. Ct. 2005) (applying the test used in
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002)).
53. 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (creating a test to analyze whether a defendant
who provided bandwidth established minimum contacts with Virginia).
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modified in Young v. New Haven Advocate54 to determine whether
statements an out-of-state citizen wrote on the Internet constitute
minimum contacts with North Carolina. 5 In ALS Scan, the plaintiff,
a Maryland corporation, sought jurisdiction over the defendant, a
Georgia-based Internet service provider, in Maryland because the
defendant provided the Internet access for a website that displayed
the plaintiff's copyrighted photographs.56 The plaintiff claimed that
the defendant had minimum contacts with Maryland solely because it
allowed the photographs to be transmitted via the Internet to
Maryland.57 ALS Scan held that a state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant "when that person (1)
directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent
of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3)
that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential cause of
action cognizable in the State's courts."58  The court found the
defendant did not have minimum contacts with Maryland because the
Internet activity was not directed at Maryland.59
In Young, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit modified the test to better suit a situation where articles are
posted on a website.6 ° In Young, the warden of a Virginia prison sued
two Connecticut newspapers in Virginia because the newspapers
wrote articles criticizing how the warden ran the prison.6" No
reporter from either paper traveled to Virginia while working on the
article.62  Both papers were distributed almost exclusively in
Connecticut.63 The warden claimed that the papers had minimum
contacts with Virginia because they posted the articles to their
54. 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002). Although Young originated in the western
district of Virginia, id. at 259, the minimum contacts analysis is the same for any state
court because it is a constitutional inquiry. See Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114,
122, 638 S.E.2d 203, 210 (2006); Johnston County v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 331 N.C. 88, 95-96,
414 S.E.2d 30, 34-35 (1992); Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 365,
248 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986).
55. See Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 66, 662 S.E.2d 12, 14 (2008) (adopting the
modification of Young); Havey v. Valentine, 172 N.C. App. 812, 816-17, 616 S.E.2d 642,
647-48 (2005) (adopting and modifying the test used in ALS Scan).
56. ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 709.
57. Id. at 712.
58. Id. at 714.
59. Id. at 715.
60. Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002) (modifying the
ALS Scan test to analyze whether two Connecticut newspapers had minimum contacts
with Virginia when they posted articles discussing a Virginia prison to their websites).
61. Id. at 259.
62. Id. at 260.
63. Id. (stating one of the papers had eight mail-order subscribers in Virginia).
1960 [Vol.87
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respective websites, which were accessible in Virginia.'M The court of
appeals found that the test created in ALS Scan works better when
the first and second parts of the test are combined .6  After modifying
the ALS Scan test, the court found that Virginia could exercise
personal jurisdiction based on the Internet activity of an out-of-state
defendant if the "Internet postings, manifest an intent to target and
focus on ... [the forum state's] readers, '66 though the posts must still
create a potential cause of action for a resident of the forum state.67
The court in Young dismissed the warden's claim because neither the
content of the websites nor the articles manifested an intent to target
Virginia readers. 68 Although North Carolina previously adopted the
test set out in ALS Scan for determining when Internet actions give
rise to personal jurisdiction,69 the court in Dailey recognized that the
Young test is a refinement of the test set forth in ALS Scan and
consequently adopted the Young test.70
Factually, Dailey is more similar to Young than ALS Scan
because it involved the posting of written statements rather than the
actions of an Internet service provider. The plaintiff, Jack Dailey,
was a resident of North Carolina who operated shooting "camps" in
North Carolina and Alabama." The defendant, Donald Popma, was
a resident of Georgia.72 The suit arose because the defendant posted
statements on an Internet bulletin board discussing the shooting
camps operated by Dailey.73  Popma admitted to posting the
statements while in Georgia. 4 According to the complaint, the posts
were "false and defamatory. ' 75  In his affidavit, the defendant
64. Id. at 261-62.
65. Id. at 263.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 263-64 (combining the first two parts of the ALS Scan test, but retaining
part three in its original form, which requires that the defendant's actions could give rise to
a cause of action in the forum state).
68. Id. at 264.
69. See Havey v. Valentine, 172 N.C. App. 812, 816-17, 616 S.E.2d 642, 647-48 (2005).
70. Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 71-72, 662 S.E.2d 12, 17-18 (2008).
71. Id. at 65-67, 662 S.E.2d at 14-15.
72. Id. at 65, 662 S.E.2d at 14.
73. Id. at 66-67, 662 S.E.2d at 14-15. The record did not contain the name of the
bulletin board on which the statements were posted. See id. at 72, 662 S.E.2d at 18.
74. Id. at 67, 662 S.E.2d at 15.
75. Id. at 66, 662 S.E.2d at 14. The complaint alleges that the posts stated that the
plaintiff:
(a) committed embezzlement; (b) committed theft; (c) is a cheat and a liar; (d) is
going to be wearing an orange jumpsuit; (e) is a crook; (f) committed felonies; (g)
is an asshole; (h) acted clandestinely and illegally; (i) is dishonest; (j) is a devious
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admitted he knew the plaintiff ran a shooting camp in North
Carolina.76
The court in Dailey applied the test used in Young and found
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was not consistent with due
process of law.77 In reaching this decision, the court noted that
something more than the " 'posting and accessibility' " of materials
via the Internet is required for the defendant to have directed his
activity toward the forum state.78 The posts were not introduced into
evidence and no other evidence existed that demonstrated that the
defendant, through the text of the posts, targeted North Carolina
readers.79 The defendant's assertion that he understood some of the
readers of the message board were not North Carolina residents
further supported the finding that the defendant had not directed his
statements at North Carolina because the limited participation of a
few North Carolina residents does not evidence intent to target North
Carolina."° Based on those reasons, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision to dismiss the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction.8"
In its decision, the court misinterpreted prior precedent that
explained the relationship between Calder and the ALS Scan test.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Dailey thought Havey v.
Valentine 2 and Burleson v. Toback83 precluded relying solely on the
effect Internet statements had on the plaintiff when determining
whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum.84 The
court's confusion is evidenced by the fact that it refers to effects and
later to "effects." 5  Apparently, the court confused effects, what
happens as a result of the defendant's actions, with "effects," where
presumably the quotations mean the court is referring to the "effects"
con man; (k) is a scumbag; (1) is the equivalent of a molester of boys; (m) will be
convicted on multiple counts; (n) is extremely underhanded; (o) is a lying fraud.
Id. The record did not contain the text of the posts, See id. at 72, 662 S.E.2d at 18.
Although the texts of the posts were not in the record, it is likely the posts made
insinuations about the North Carolina activities of a North Carolina resident.
76. See id. at 66-67, 662 S.E.2d at 15.
77. Id. at 72-73, 662 S.E.2d at 18.
78. Id. at 71-72, 662 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d
256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 75, 662 S.E.2d at 19.
82. 172 N.C. App. 812, 616 S.E.2d 642 (2005).
83. 391 F. Supp. 2d 401 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
84. Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 73-74,662 S.E.2d at 18.
85. Id. at 73-74, 662 S.E.2d at 18-19.
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test.86 Both Havey and Burleson stand for the proposition that effects
alone cannot create minimum contacts. This proposition is
consistent with Calder, which is why the Court in Calder distinguished
the hypothetical welder from the defendants.88 The actions of the
hypothetical welder would have effects in foreign forums, but the
effects of his actions would not constitute minimum contacts.89 In
contrast, the two defendants, by aiming their actions toward
California, had minimum contacts with California, and jurisdiction
was appropriate because of the "effects" of their actions.9" The
targeting of California, rather than the results of their actions,
established minimum contacts in California. "Effects" signifies that a
defendant targeted his actions toward a forum, not that the results of
his actions were felt in a forum.9 The court in Dailey failed to
appreciate the persuasiveness of Calder because it assumed minimum
contacts must exist before it could consider effects. By erroneously
believing Young precluded using "effects," the Dailey court
effectively treated the "effects" test as a subsequent inquiry to a
minimum contacts analysis.
However, Calder demonstrates that the "effects" of a defendant's
actions are to be used when determining whether minimum contacts
exist, not as an entirely subsequent inquiry as the court in Dailey
misconstrued it to be. 9 Illustratively, the effects felt in California, by
themselves, were not dispositive in deciding the outcome in Calder.93
86. Id.
87. See Burleson, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 416 (stating a defendant is subject to jurisdiction
in places where he has minimum contacts, but not every jurisdiction where the plaintiff is
injured by his actions); Havey, 172 N.C. App. at 816-17, 616 S.E.2d at 647-48 (quoting
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002)) (stating
that a person who posts information on the Internet is not subject to jurisdiction in every
state where the material is "received"). Neither Burleson nor Havey refer to effects or,
more importantly, "effects." See Burleson, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 416; Havey, 172 N.C. at 816-
17, 616 S.E.2d at 647-48.
88. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
89. Id. at 789-90.
90. See id. at 789.
91. See Counts & Martin, supra note 27, at 1123.
92. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (stating the maxim "jurisdiction ... [is] proper ...
based on the 'effects,' " and then explaining the reasons why it is reasonable for
defendants to go to California to answer for their effects); see also Counts & Martin, supra
note 27, at 1124-25.
93. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-91 (allowing jurisdiction in California not only because
of the "effects" of the reporter's actions, but also because of their intentional actions
aimed at California); see also Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, 514 F.3d 1063,
1077 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing that the fact the defendant's actions had effects in the
forum state has never been sufficient to support a state's exercise of jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 731 (E.D. Pa.
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The fact that the opinion continues for two more pages after the
maxim "jurisdiction ... [is] proper ... based on the 'effects' ,914
illustrates that there was more to the Court's analysis than finding the
defendants' actions had effects in California. The totality of the
circumstances proved that the defendants targeted California.95 Thus,
they had sufficient minimum contacts with California to " 'reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there' " to be held accountable for
the effects of their actions.96
The precedents Dailey cites to prove that minimum contacts and
"effects" are separate analyses do not prove that analyzing minimum
contacts and analyzing "effects" are distinct steps; rather, the
precedents demonstrate no minimum contacts existed and "effects"
are irrelevant because the "Calder factors" were not satisfied.97 If a
defendant satisfies the "Calder factors," then the defendant has
minimum contacts with the forum state such that jurisdiction is
proper based on the "effects" of his actions. 98
Using the "Calder factors" as a blueprint for determining when
Internet statements create minimum contacts with a forum does not
threaten traditional due process limitations on jurisdiction because
1999) (stating that suffering harm in a location was never enough to satisfy the "effects"
test).
94. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
95. Id. at 789-90.
96. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)); see Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1993).
97. The court in Dailey relied on the following cases: Young v. New Haven Advocate,
315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002), Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 2002), Barrett,
44 F. Supp. 2d 717, and Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002). As previously
discussed, Young involved a website, which cannot be linked with a specific area like a
magazine or a discussion of a specific entity. Young, 315 F.3d at 258. Machulsky involved
statements posted on Ebay's customer feedback page. See Machulsky, 210 F. Supp. 2d at
533. The feedback page targeted a global audience and did not specifically target any one
location. See id. at 542. In Barrett, the defendant allegedly wrote libelous statements on
listservs and USENET news groups. Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 722. The listservs and
USENET groups had from several hundred to thousands of readers scattered across the
nation. Id. No evidence existed that the listservs or USENET groups had a plurality of
readers in one state or that the defendant knew where the plaintiff lived. See id. The
defendant in Griffis posted statements on an archaeology-related newsgroup about an
Alabama resident plaintiff. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 530. No evidence linked the newsgroup
with a particular geographic location. See id. As a newsgroup devoted to archaeology, it
is understandable the group had no geographic focus because archaeology is not tied to
any one location. The plaintiff could not prove any Alabama resident read the statement,
much less that Alabama has a unique relationship with archaeology. Id. at 536. Since
each of these precedents does not have a convergence of the three factors from Calder,
they do not satisfy the "effects" test. Thus, the defendants do not have minimum contacts
with the forum state because the "effects" test is not met.
98. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
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Calder has an inherent minimum contacts requirement. As discussed
below, the "Calder factors" will guide whether a defendant displayed
an intent to target a state while providing limits on where jurisdiction
can be obtained for Internet communications.
II. APPLYING THE "CALDER FACTORS" TO DAILEY V. POPMA
Although the requirements for personal jurisdiction have
become more flexible because of technological innovations, "it is a
mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts."99  Even
though those words were written fifty years ago, they apply equally
well today as the Internet allows material to be published and
accessed both ubiquitously and instantly. To prevent the erosion of
jurisdictional limits, North Carolina courts have adapted personal
jurisdiction precedent to determine when Internet activity gives rise
to jurisdiction in the forum state.' But in order to conduct a
meaningful analysis of Internet activity, North Carolina courts need
to look past what the Court said in Calder and look at the factors it
used to find that the newspaper article at issue was directed toward
California. The "Calder factors" can provide guidance as to what is
required for a defendant to manifest an intent to direct his Internet
activity at North Carolina while maintaining jurisdictional limits. If
the court in Dailey used the "Calder factors," it would have likely
noticed key factual differences between the situation in Dailey and
the precedents on which it relied, and it would have ultimately
concluded Popma did manifest an intent to direct his Internet posts
toward North Carolina.
In Calder, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
California Court of Appeals and held that California's exercise of
jurisdiction over two Florida citizens was proper."1 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on three factors: the publication
medium," 2 the defendants' knowledge that the plaintiff lived and
99. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (discussing the trend of more
frequently allowing states to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants).
100. See Young, 315 F.3d at 262-63 (citing ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants,
Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (basing its test on Calder v. Jones)) (explaining that
a state can exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when the defendant
manifests an intent to direct his Internet activity at the forum state). As previously
mentioned, the North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the Young test in Dailey. See
Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 66,662 S.E.2d 12, 14 (2008).
101. Calder, 465 U.S. at 791.
102. Id. at 789-90.
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worked in California," 3 and the intentional nature of the defendants'
actions." These three factors working in concert demonstrated the
defendants' intent to target California and made it reasonable for
them to foresee being haled into a California court to answer for the
effects of their actions.'05 These three factors, when applied to Dailey,
support a finding that North Carolina can exercise personal
jurisdiction over Popma consistent with due process. The defendant's
choice of publication medium, knowledge of the plaintiff's location,
and intentional actions displayed a purposeful targeting of North
Carolina. Because of the convergence of these three factors, the
defendant could have foreseen being haled to North Carolina.0 6
Although there is a sparse factual record in Dailey, the record
contains sufficient details to conduct an analysis of these three
factors.'0 7
A. Publication Medium
When analyzing the target audience of a written statement, a
logical place to begin the analysis is with the source of publication.
Analyzing the source is a good indication of the target audience for
print media that is unavailable except in printed format because the
physical distribution area demonstrates the intended target area. If
an author wants to target North Carolina with a printed article, he or
she must choose a source distributed in North Carolina or the
audience will not be able to access the source. Based on the assumed
correlation between distribution area and intended target area, it is
not surprising that the United States Supreme Court began its
opinion in Calder by analyzing the scope of the National Enquirer's
distribution.18 The Court noted that the Enquirer had its highest
circulation in California by a wide margin. 9 The high circulation
numbers contributed to the Court's conclusion that the injurious
effects would be felt in California.1
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 790.
106. See id.
107. The defendant did not provide the court with a copy of the bulletin board posts,
which is why the record lacks detail. Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 72, 662 S.E.2d
12, 18 (2008).
108. Calder, 465 U.S. at 784.
109. Id. at 785. The Enquirer sold 604,431 copies of the September 18, 1979 issue in
California and 316,911 in the next highest-selling state, New York. Id. at 785 n.2.
110. Id. at 789-90. The defendants' knowledge that the plaintiff's professional and
personal life was centered in California contributed to this finding. See id. The knowledge
of a defendant will be discussed later. See infra Part II.B.
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While Internet sites are not limited to a physical distribution area
like print media, they can be linked to a geographic area through
their content. For example, the website www.beerinator.com is
devoted to the North Carolina beer community."' Although this
website is accessible from any place in the world, its content
demonstrates it is focused on North Carolina.'12 By focusing solely on
the general accessibility of websites, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals erroneously ignored the geographic focus of the message
board used by Popma."3
The National Enquirer is more similar to the online message
board in Dailey than one might think. Both are accessible
nationally."4 While the message board is much easier to access,
4,687,769 of the National Enquirer's readers of the September 18,
1979 issue, eighty-nine percent of the total readers of that issue,
resided outside of California."5 Although information on the location
of readers of the message board is absent from the record, it seems
likely that most reside outside of North Carolina as well.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that more than eighty-nine percent of the
message board readers reside outside of North Carolina considering
the board's focus on shooting camps in the southeast. 16 The fact that
many readers live outside of North Carolina does not mean, by itself,
Popma failed to target North Carolina when he participated in the
discussion about the plaintiff."7
Given the finding that the National Enquirer displayed an intent
to target California, the bulletin board posts likely displayed an intent
to target North Carolina because the bulletin board targeted a
regional, rather than a national, audience. Popma participated in a
discussion specifically about the plaintiff's shooting camps which were
111. North Carolina's Beer Community, http://www.beerinator.com (last visited Aug.
24, 2009).
112. See, e.g., Foothills Does NC Proud!, North Carolina's Beer Community, supra
note 111 (Oct. 20, 2008, 10:28 EDT); Triangle Beer Meetup, North Carolina's Beer
Community, supra note 111 (Aug. 14, 2008, 16:34 EDT).
113. See Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 73-74, 662 S.E.2d 12, 18-19 (2008) (citing
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002)).
114. Calder, 465 U.S. at 785 (stating that the Enquirer has a national weekly circulation
of five million magazines).
115. Id. at 785 n.2.
116. Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 67,662 S.E.2d at 15.
117. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785, 790 (finding the National Enquirer's "intentional, and
allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California" even though a majority of
its readers lived outside California).
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attended by shooters from across the southeastern United States. 118
By posting on a discussion board about a North Carolina entity whose
clients are southeastern shooters, Popma chose a much more targeted
medium than the Enquirer, which is nationally distributed and has
national subjects. Even if the board was on a website devoted to
discussing shooting nationally, the defendant chose to post on a
discussion with a regional focus, which displays intent to target an
area. It is likely that at least a plurality of the readers of this thread
would be North Carolina residents because they would be the most
familiar with and interested in a local shooting range." 9 Calder shows
publishing a statement in a medium with a plurality of readers in the
forum state is sufficient to demonstrate an intent to target the
forum. 2 Since Popma chose a medium where at least a plurality of
readers would likely be in North Carolina, the publication medium is
sufficiently focused on North Carolina to demonstrate intent to target
North Carolina.
In deciding Dailey, the North Carolina Court of Appeals relied
on Burleson, the only case cited by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals that applied North Carolina law to Internet posts,'2 ' which
involved an argument identical to that used in Dailey to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.'22 While the court did not find
118. Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 67, 662 S.E.2d at 15. The record does not contain any of
the posts Dailey wrote, which limits the analysis. Id. at 72, 662 S.E.2d at 18. The lack of
facts in the record is one reason why the Supreme Court of North Carolina should remand
this case.
119. At least one court, when determining whether a defendant had minimum contacts
with North Carolina because of a website, has been willing to assume a substantial number
of North Carolina residents read materials posted on a website when the actual number of
hits occurring in North Carolina was unknown. See Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F.
Supp. 481, 487 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (stating that a defendant purposefully directed activities
at North Carolina by advertising its product on a website because a reasonable inference
could be made that a substantial number of hits occurred in North Carolina until specific
information was available to prove the inference false). But see ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Centricut, L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 n.4 (D.S.C. 1999) (criticizing Superguide as the
minority approach). While Superguide has been criticized, its inference seems more
appropriate for posts on an Internet bulletin board discussion of an entity of the forum
rather than for websites that are not related to a geographic location.
120. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 784-85 (finding a California court could properly exercise
jurisdiction over the defendants although a plurality of the Enquirer's readers were not
located in California).
121. 391 F. Supp. 2d 401, 414-15 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (applying the ALS Scan test, as
modified in Young, to determine whether posts on a web forum would support personal
jurisdiction in North Carolina).
122. Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 74, 662 S.E.2d at 19. The court in Dailey also cited
several cases from other jurisdictions. See id. at 74-75, 662 S.E.2d at 19-20 (citing
Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542 (D.N.J. 2002); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44
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personal jurisdiction in Burleson,123 if the publication media are
analyzed, Dailey is distinguishable from Burleson. Burleson involved
allegedly libelous statements written on an Internet forum 124 which
had an entirely different focus than the forum in Dailey, as the forum
in Burleson was designed as a forum for Canadians and grew to have
an international audience. 125 Ample evidence showed the forum did
not target North Carolina like either the National Enquirer targeted
California or the bulletin board in Dailey targeted North Carolina.
Twenty-one to forty-four of the approximately two thousand
members of the forum were residents of North Carolina in
Burleson, 26 and the forum received a minimal amount of revenue
from North Carolina. 27 Due to its international focus, the forum in
Burleson, as a publication medium, did not demonstrate that the
defendant targeted North Carolina. 128
Analyzing the publication medium also differentiates Dailey
from Young, another precedent on which the North Carolina Court
of Appeals relied.'29 Young involved two Connecticut newspapers,
the New Haven Advocate and the Hartford Courant, which published
selected print material on their respective websites 3 °  The
newspapers wrote articles about the transfer of Connecticut inmates
to Virginia prisons 3' and posted these articles on their websites
32
The plaintiff, the warden of a Virginia prison discussed in the articles,
claimed the defendants subjected themselves to personal jurisdiction
in Virginia because Virginia residents could access the website
articles in Virginia.'33 Unlike Dailey, which only involved the Internet
message board, the newspapers in Young were both physically
distributed and available online.'34 While the newspapers were
F. Supp. 2d 717, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 535-36 (Minn.
2002)).
123. Burleson, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 412.
126. Id. The few members from North Carolina had minimal activity on the board.
Only 2.2% of the messages on the forum were written by North Carolina members. Id.
127. The forum received $300.00 from North Carolina-related advertising over an
eight-year period. Id. at 413.
128. Id. at 415.
129. Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 71-72, 662 S.E.2d 12, 17-18 (2008).
130. Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 259.
132. Id. at 260.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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distributed locally, their websites were accessible globally.135 Due to
the limited distribution area of the print publications, the Young
court expressed skepticism that the papers established minimum
contacts with a forum outside their distribution area merely by
maintaining websites.3 6 The court proceeded to analyze the content
of the websites to determine if the websites targeted an area outside
of the physical distribution area,137 and correctly concluded that the
websites targeted the same market as their distribution area because
the website content was local.138 The divergence between the
worldwide accessibility of the website and the decidedly local
distribution area of the papers prevented the court from finding that
the websites displayed an intent to target Virginia. The bulletin
board in Dailey did not have a sister print publication that targeted a
specific geographic area. While a website might not display an intent
to target a forum when the forum is outside the distribution area of
the website's companion print publication, a website can nonetheless
target a specific state when it does not have a companion print
publication.
Dailey also asked if the defendant targeted the readers of the
forum state through his Internet postings,139 but this question was
unnecessary because of the nature of the bulletin board. A textual
analysis was not needed in Calder to find that the authors reasonably
could have foreseen being haled to California.14 ° The court did not
need to analyze the text because the Enquirer targeted California due
to its high circulation in California. 1 ' The circulation figures were
sufficient to prove the authors reasonably should have been able to
foresee being haled into California because the brunt of the effect
would occur where the Enquirer had its highest circulation. Similar to
Calder, the publication medium in Dailey targets North Carolina.
Popma did not post on a general thread or a website that lacked a
geographical focus. Instead, he posted on a thread specifically
135. The Advocate is a free weekly newspaper distributed locally around New Haven,
Connecticut. Id. at 259. It had no subscribers in Virginia at the time of the suit. Id. at
259-60. The Courant is published daily and is circulated around Hartford, Connecticut.
Id. at 260. It had eight subscribers in Virginia when it published the allegedly libelous
articles. Id.
136. Id. at 263.
137. Id.
138. Id. All of the advertisements, weather, traffic information, and feature stories
were focused locally on Connecticut readers. See id.
139. Daily v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 72,662 S.E.2d 12, 18 (2008).
140. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,789-90 (1983).
141. Id.
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discussing a North Carolina business. Because the post concerned a
North Carolina business, it follows that the readers of the post would
likely be from North Carolina. 14 2 Therefore, a textual analysis of the
posts was unnecessary because the publication medium displayed an
intent to target North Carolina since the thread specifically discussed
a North Carolina entity. 143
B. Defendant's Knowledge of Plaintiffs Location
What a defendant knew about the plaintiff is relevant to a
minimum contacts analysis because the defendant's knowledge will
inform where he could have "reasonably anticipated being haled into
court.""' In the context of defamation, the author of the allegedly
defamatory statements can assume an individual will suffer the brunt
of his injury where his personal or professional life is centered. 145
When a defendant knows where the effects of his actions will be felt,
it is reasonable to anticipate being haled to that location to answer for
the consequences of those actions. The reasonableness of this belief
will not change based on the source used to publish the statements. If
a person posts allegedly defamatory statements to a website and
knows where the target's personal or professional life is based, then
the author could reasonably anticipate being haled there even though
the website is omnipresent.
In Calder, the defendants knew California was the center of the
plaintiff's personal and professional life. 146 Based on that knowledge,
the Court found that the defendants knew the effects of their actions
would be centered in California. 147 Thus, it was reasonable for the
defendants to anticipate being haled to California. 4 '
142. Social psychologists have recognized the importance of proximity in creating
affinity. Proximity is important because it encourages familiarity, and familiarity increases
positive reactions toward a stimulus. KENNETH S. BORDENS & IRWIN A. HOROWITZ,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 334-35 (2d ed. 2002). Since North Carolinians are closer to the
plaintiff's shooting camps, they would most likely have more affinity for his shooting
camp. North Carolina readers would be most likely to read the posts because of their
affinity and proximity to the camps. See id.
143. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
144. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980).
145. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90; Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C.,
297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1165 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
146. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 790 ("An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek
redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in
California.").
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Similarly, in Bochan v. La Fontaine,49 a case involving
defamatory statements written on the Internet and an argument for
jurisdiction based on Calder, the court found the exercise of personal
jurisdiction was proper because the defendants knew where the
plaintiff lived and worked.15 ° The plaintiff, a Virginia resident,
alleged that three defendants, Texas and New Mexico residents,
defamed him in Virginia by posting libelous messages to the
"USENET newsgroup" named alt.conspiracy.fk.151 Although the
court applied the Virginia long-arm statute, the minimum contacts
analysis would be the same for a North Carolina court because
minimum contacts must comply with constitutional due process
limitations.' The court found that because the defendants knew the
plaintiff lived in Virginia, they knew the predominant effects of their
actions would be felt in Virginia.'53 Thus, the court stated that the
defendants should have foreseen being haled into court in Virginia. 54
Considering that many courts frequently find the defendant's
knowledge of where the plaintiff lives or works persuasive when
evaluating whether exerting personal jurisdiction would be proper, 5
the court in Dailey failed to give adequate weight to the fact that
Popma knew Dailey operated a shooting camp in North Carolina
149. 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999).
150. See id. at 702-03.
151. Id. at 695. A "USENET newsgroup" has been described in the following manner:
USENET newsgroups are disseminated using ad hoc, peer to peer connections
between approximately 200,000 computers (called USENET "servers") around
the world. For unmoderated newsgroups, when an individual user with access to a
USENET server posts a message to a newsgroup, the message is automatically
forwarded to all adjacent USENET servers that furnish access to the newsgroup,
and it is then propagated to the servers adjacent to those servers, etc. The
messages are temporarily stored on each receiving server, where they are available
for review and response by individual users. The messages are automatically and
periodically purged from each system after a time to make room for new messages.
Id. at 695 n.2 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
152. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788.
153. Bochan, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
154. Id.
155. See First Am. First, Inc. v. Nat'l Assoc. of Bank Women, 802 F.2d 1511, 1517 (4th
Cir. 1986) (finding the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Virginia proper because the
defendant knew that the majority of the harm suffered from libelous letters would be felt
where the plaintiff resided and conducted business); Telco Commc'ns v. An Apple a Day,
977 F. Supp. 404, 408 (E.D. Va. 1997) (stating that the defendants' knowledge that the
plaintiff's business was based in Virginia contributed to a finding that the defendants
should have foreseen being haled into Virginia); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Barnett, 76 N.C.
App. 605, 609, 334 S.E.2d 91, 93-94 (1985) (finding jurisdiction was constitutional when an
out-of-state resident knowingly commits a tort against a North Carolina resident because
it "was clear that the alleged tort would have its damaging effect in North Carolina").
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when conducting its due process analysis. In his affidavit, Popma
stated that he knew the plaintiff conducted shooting camps in
Ramseur, North Carolina.156 The defendant should have known the
majority of the effects of his actions would have been felt in North
Carolina because he knew that is where the plaintiff worked. 57 Thus,
the court should have found it was reasonable for Popma to
anticipate being haled into North Carolina to answer for the truth of
his statements. 58 The Dailey court erred because the defendant's
knowledge of the plaintiff's location was not a part of its analysis.5 9
Using the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's place of
business or residence as a factor in due process analysis will limit the
reach of jurisdiction for Internet communications. The court in
Dailey worried that allowing the "effects" test to support jurisdiction
would erode a defense of personal jurisdiction. 6 The court believed
a plaintiff would suffer effects in every state due to the omnipresence
of the Internet."' Thus, the court feared a defendant could be sued
anywhere.'62 This fear is ill-founded. First, an individual would suffer
most of the effects from libelous statements in the state of his or her
residency or principal place of business. Second, the defendant would
not foresee being haled into court in a state where the plaintiff does
not reside or work. Third, effects alone were never enough to
support jurisdiction under the "effects" test set forth in Calder.'63 It is
the "Calder factors" working in concert that allow a defendant to
reasonably foresee being haled into the forum."M Likewise, because
the harm is typically focused in the plaintiff's state of residency or
principal place of business, the defendant should foresee being called
to that state; but if he is ignorant of the state where the plaintiff
resides or works, he cannot foresee being haled into court there.
Thus, statements on the Internet will not erode geographical limits on
judicial power because a defendant's knowledge about the plaintiff
would limit the states where he could foresee being haled into court.
156. Dailey v. Popma, 191 N.C. App. 64, 67, 662 S.E.2d 12, 15 (2008).
157. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790; Ciba-Geigy, 76 N.C. App. at 609, 334 S.E.2d at 93-94.
158. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
159. See Dailey, 191 N.C. App. at 73-75,662 S.E.2d. at 19.
160. Id. at 73, 662 S.E.2d at 18-19.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89; Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 731
(E.D. Pa. 1999).
164. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 730-31 (denying jurisdiction although the
defendant's libelous statements harmed the plaintiff in Pennsylvania because harm alone
is not enough to support jurisdiction).
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C. Intentional Nature of the Action
It is not surprising that courts are more likely to find that a
defendant had minimum contacts with the forum when his contact
with the forum is the result of intentional actions as opposed to
untargeted negligence. This is because of the fact that nonresident
defendants must purposefully avail themselves of the privileges of the
forum state in order for a court to find the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum state.165  A defendant's intentional actions
demonstrate purposeful availment.' 66  In Calder, the defendants
analogized themselves to welders who worked on a boiler in Florida
which exploded in California.67 According to the defendants, a court
would not grant jurisdiction over welders who had no control over
where their employers shipped the boiler. 6  The defendants in
Calder claimed they lacked control over the circulation of the article
in California; thus, they should not be subject to jurisdiction in
California.1 69  The Court rejected this analogy because, unlike the
welders who committed untargeted negligence, the defendants
committed intentional actions.7 The Court held jurisdiction was
"proper because of their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to
cause injury to respondent in California."''
Later courts have continued to differentiate between intentional
conduct and untargeted negligence. Purposefully circulating
magazines in a state was sufficient to support jurisdiction over an out-
of-state publisher because the circulation was intentional and not
"random, isolated, or fortuitous."'7 One of the factors the North
Carolina Court of Appeals used to exert personal jurisdiction over an
Indiana resident employed by a Greensboro company was that the
Indiana resident intentionally sent fraudulent refund requests to the
company's office in North Carolina over a two-year period.173 Courts
are more likely to find that personal jurisdiction exists when the
165. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
166. See Carswell Distrib. Co. v. U.S.A.'s Wild Thing, Inc., 122 N.C. App. 105, 109, 468
S.E.2d 566, 569 (1996); New Bern Pool & Supply Co. v. Graubart, 94 N.C. App. 619, 626,
381 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1989).
167. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 791 (emphasis added). As discussed above, the defendants' choice of
publication medium and knowledge that the plaintiff lived and worked in California
demonstrated the injury was calculated to cause injury in California. See supra Part II.A-
B.
172. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
173. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Barnett, 76 N.C. App. 605,605-06, 334 S.E.2d 91. 92 (1985).
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defendant acted intentionally because the defendant's intentional
actions demonstrate that the defendant purposefully availed himself
of the privileges of the forum state.'74
By ignoring the intentional nature of Popma's actions, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals incorrectly affirmed a dismissal based on
the defendant's assertion of a lack of personal jurisdiction. Popma is
not like a welder who committed "untargeted negligence. 175 Popma
intentionally wrote the posts about someone he knew worked in
North Carolina. Popma also intentionally chose a medium directed at
North Carolina. Since Popma's contact with North Carolina was not
random or fortuitous, the court should have found that the defendant
was subject to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina.176
Since Popma satisfied each of the three "Calder factors," it would
have been reasonable for him to anticipate being haled to North
Carolina. Popma chose a publication medium that would focus the
effects of his statements in North Carolina by writing on a thread
discussing Dailey's shooting camps. He knew Dailey worked in
North Carolina, so he knew his statements impugning the plaintiff's
professional activities would have their effect in North Carolina.
Lastly, he acted intentionally. He should have foreseen being haled
to North Carolina because he intentionally wrote messages about
someone he knew to be a North Carolina resident on an Internet
bulletin board discussing that person. Therefore, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in North Carolina would be consistent with due
process limitations.
174. See Summit Lodging, L.L.C. v. Jones, Spitz, Moorhead, Baird & Albergotti, P.A.,
176 N.C. App. 697, 703, 627 S.E.2d 259, 264-65 (2006) (allowing North Carolina to exert
personal jurisdiction over a South Carolina law firm because the law firm filed the
plaintiff's Articles of Organization with the North Carolina Secretary of State, called
various persons in North Carolina, sent letters to North Carolina, and wrote emails to
persons in North Carolina); CFA Med., Inc. v. Burkhalter, 95 N.C. App. 391, 395, 383
S.E.2d 214, 216 (1989) ("Which party initiates the contact is taken to be a critical factor in
assessing whether a non-resident defendant has made 'purposeful availment.' " (citing
Cameron-Brown Co. v. Daves, 83 N.C. App. 281, 287, 350 S.E.2d 111, 115-16 (1986)));
Brickman v. Codella, 83 N.C. App. 377, 383-84, 350 S.E.2d 164, 168 (1986); see also
Cambridge Homes of N.C. v. Hyundai Constr., Inc., __ N.C. App. _, _, 670 S.E.2d 290,
297 (2008) (finding that North Carolina could not exert jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant even though the defendant entered into a contract with a North Carolina entity
because the defendant did not "initiate" any of the contacts with North Carolina).
175. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
176. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774 (finding the requirements of minimum contacts are
met when the defendant's contacts with a forum are neither "random, isolated, or
fortuitous").
2009] 1975
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
III. NORTH CAROLINA'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING ITS CITIZENS
Once a defendant has established minimum contacts with the
forum state, the minimum contacts can be viewed in light of other
factors to determine if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
offend traditional notions of " 'fair play and substantial justice.' "177
One of the fairness factors a court considers is " 'the forum State's
interest in adjudicating the dispute.' 178 Fairness factors sometimes
allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction to pass constitutional due
process requirements upon a lesser showing of contacts than would
normally be required. 79
As shown in the preceding sections, Dailey had minimum
contacts with North Carolina; therefore, it is proper to consider
whether North Carolina's exercise of personal jurisdiction would
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" when
considered with North Carolina's interest in adjudicating the
dispute.' North Carolina has a strong interest in adjudicating this
dispute based on its interest in protecting its citizens from tortious
acts of out-of-state individuals."' The North Carolina Court of
Appeals has said that the court is more willing to find assertions of
jurisdiction constitutional in tort cases because of the strong public
interest a state has in protecting its citizens from out-of-state
tortfeasors' 82 As discussed above, Internet harassment poses a real
threat to citizens." 3 Because Popma had minimum contacts with
North Carolina, the state's strong public interest in protecting Dailey
from Internet harassment provides additional support for allowing
North Carolina to exercise jurisdiction over Popma."'
177. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
178. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)). Another fairness factor is the "convenience of the forum to the parties." Banc of
Am. Secs., v. Evergreen Int'l. Aviation, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 690, 699, 611 S.E.2d 179, 186
(2005).
179. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80.
180. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int'l. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
345 (1945)).
181. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Barnett, 76 N.C. App. 605,608, 334 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1985).
182. Id. at 608, 334 S.E.2d at 93; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 36 cmt. c (1989) ("A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction
over those who commit torts within its territory. This is because torts involve wrongful
conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against which it attempts to afford protection, by
providing that a tortfeasor shall be liable for damages which are the proximate result of his
tort.").
183. See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
184. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
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CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
standards used to determine the proper exercise of personal
jurisdiction must adapt to changes in technology, but courts must
maintain the constitutional limits on a state's power to exert
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. In Hanson v. Denckla,'85
the Court stated:
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce
between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has
undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in
communications and transportation has made the defense of a
suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these
changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v.
Neff to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington. But it is a mistake to assume that this trend
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power
of the respective States.'86
Using the "Calder factors" to analyze whether statements written
on the Internet can give rise to personal jurisdiction will strike the
required balance between flexibility and retaining limitations on
jurisdiction. These factors provide criteria to evaluate the
circumstances surrounding Internet communications. These criteria
will provide flexibility in a jurisdiction by highlighting similarities
Internet communications can have with previous communications
that supported jurisdiction. These criteria were useful in highlighting
similarities between the bulletin board in Dailey and articles
published in the National Enquirer. These criteria will provide
limitations because when fewer criteria are present jurisdiction is less
likely to comply with due process requirements.""
185. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
186. Id. at 250-51 (citation omitted).
187. Compare Burleson v. Toback, 391 F. Supp. 2d 401, 415 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (denying
personal jurisdiction in North Carolina based on statements written on an Internet
message board where only twenty-two to forty-four out of roughly 2000 members were
North Carolinians and the defendants apparently did not know the plaintiff was a North
Carolina resident), with Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 702 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(allowing the exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants because it was
reasonable for the defendants to anticipate being haled to Virginia when they intentionally
wrote about someone they knew to be a Virginia resident).
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Thus, the Supreme Court of North Carolina should remand the
decision to dismiss Dailey v. Popma because of a lack of personal
jurisdiction so that the record can be developed consistent with the
"Calder factors." While Internet communications may not as clearly
demonstrate an intent to target a state as older forms of
communication, "we are concerned solely with 'minimum' contacts,
not the 'best' contacts." '88 Although Dailey may not have had the
best contacts with North Carolina, he likely had minimum contacts so
that he could have reasonably foreseen being haled to North Carolina
to answer for his statements.'89
ALEXANDER B. PUNGER
188. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 228 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. See id.
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